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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. What is the duty of a landlord to a commercial 
tenant under a monthly rental arrangement? 
2. Is a landlord obligated to protect tenants from 
the criminal attacks of third parties? 
3. Did the Appellant-landlord breach his duty toward 
Respondent? 
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in 
failing to give the Appellant's requested instructions regarding 
the duty of a landlord towards his commercial tenant? 
5* Did the Plaintiffs lay adequate foundation for 
the admission of their Exhibits relating to losses of inventory? 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Natu re . This i s an Appeal from a spec ia l jury verd ic t 
awarding damages to the Respondents caused by Appel lan t ' s negligence 
in making a hole above Respondents' jewelry s tore, and the discovery 
of an i n t r u d e r in the room where the ho le was t h e a f t e r n o o n 
be fo re the s t o r e was b u r g l a r i z e d , and A p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e to 
warn Respondents or p ro tec t t h e i r proper ty . 
Court and D i s p o s i t i o n in Court Below. On September 
12f 1984, Respondents f i l ed t h e i r Complaint in the Court below 
based on the neg l igence of Appellant in rent ing to a p a r t i c u l a r 
t e n a n t or in making ho l e s in the f l o o r of an apar tment above 
the jewelry s to re of Respondents (R. 2 -7 ) . Later , in Respondent's 
Amendment of Complaint , A p p e l l a n t s ' d i s cove ry of the i n t r u d e r 
the a f t e rnoon before b u r g l a r y was added (R. 44 -46) . The case 
was assigned to the Honorable James S. Sawaya. 
The m a t t e r was t r i e d before a j u r y from May 21-24 , 
1985. At the c l o s e of the Responden ts ' c a s e , Appe l l an t moved 
f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . (R. 553-555) . The Court denied the 
Motion for Directed Verdic t . (R. 561-562). 
The j u ry r e t u r n e d a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t in favor of the 
Respondents, finding the Appe l l an t was 100% n e g l i g e n t and s a id 
neg l i gence p rox ima te ly caused Responden t s ' damages. Judgment 
was entered on the v e r d i c t . (R. 216-218). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As per Respondents' Amendment of Complaint (R. 44-46)
 f 
this action was brought claiming that the Appellant had been 
negligent in making holes in the floor above Respondent's jewelry 
store, and in discovering the afternoon before the store was 
burgularized that an intruder had broken into room 214, where 
the holes were, had left windows ajar and open, footprints were 
discovered on the roof looking into room 214. This intrusion 
was discovered by the Appellant, his wife, and his building 
managers — his daughter, Ivy Carolind, and son-in-law, Pat 
Carolind. 
The situation was not reported to the Police or to 
the Respondents. Respondents claimed that the Appellant failed 
to warn the Respondents of the danger to their property or to 
take adequate measures to protect their property, and, as a 
result, thieves were able to gain easy access through the hole 
into the jewelry store, which resulted in Respondents' losses. 
The hole was made by the Appellant approximately one 
year before the burglary for the purpose of making plumbing 
repairs, although the nearest pipes were 5-6 feet away from 
the hole (R. 324-325). After making the hole which was in a 
closet 
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a r e a , t h e A p p e l l a n t s t o r e d i tems in room 214 (R. 328) u n t i l 
approx imate ly 10 days before the b u r g l a r y , a t which t ime t h e 
room was c o m p l e t e l y c leaned out (R. 324) . Ten days b e f o r e , 
or the Friday before the burglary, the door and sheetrock surrounding 
the c lose t area , where the hole was, were removed by the Appellant 
or h i s son-in-law (R. 340 & R. 367), 
P r i o r to the d i s c o v e r y of the in t rude r , the Appellant 
had been advised by the p r i o r owner of the b u i l d i n g and by the 
Respondent tha t approximately 12 years before, someone had attempted 
to enter the jewelry s to re through the f l o o r in room 215, which 
i s a c r o s s t h e h a l l from 214. Appel lan t had a l s o been shown 
the wi r ing in the back p a r t of the s t o r e p l aced t h e r e a f t e r 
t h i s a t t empt (R. 355, 396, 650, 651 & 656), and many occasions 
p r i o r to the burglary , replaced ce i l i ng t i l e s in the f ron t p a r t 
of t h e s t o r e and did not observe s imi lar ; wi r ing on the l a t h 
and p l a s t e r in the front p a r t of the s t o r e , which had the hole 
above i t (R. 395, 396 & 397). 
A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he assumed t h a t the a rea 
beneath the la th and p l a s t e r where the hole was was a l s o wired 
(R. 356), and admitted t h a t , apparently, th is was a "bad assumption" 
(R. 649). 
A p p e l l a n t had problems with t r a n s i e n t s coming i n t o 
the building but never before in room 214 (R. 334). The t r a n s i e n t s 
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were u s u a l l y in the hal lway (R. 336) . Appe l lan t did not do 
anything part icular to keep t r a n s i e n t s out (R. 338). The apartment 
a rea of the b u i l d i n g was always open to the p u b l i c and anyone 
could gain access to the hallways (R. 339-340). 
There was testimony tha t Edward Garcia f the l a s t tenant 
to occupy room 215, was a drug a d d i c t , and had been a r r e s t e d 
before and tha t he had a brother who had a criminal record (R. 405, 
434, 536 & 537). Because of Mr. Garc ia ' s b r o t h e r ' s bad charac te r , 
he was given as a suspec t to the pol ice by Appel lan t ' s managers 
(R. 365, 366 & 373). 
The h o l e c o u l d be seen from the hal lway (R. 342) , 
and the i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t Mr. G a r c i a had 
knowledge of the holes in the f loor in room 214 (R. 292). 
There was a l s o t e s t imony t h a t the A p p e l l a n t a n d / o r 
h i s managers knew of p r i o r b r e a k - i n s i n t o t e n a n t s ' apartments 
(R. 436), and that even the Appellant had had too l s s to len (R. 436, 
437 & 643). 
On Sunday , Apr i l 1, 1984, Appe l lan t d i scove red the 
door to room 214 was locked from the ins ide (R. 330-331). Appellant 
looked down the h a l l t o a window a t the end of the h a l l t h a t 
was opened, looked out t he window, and d i scovered f o o t p r i n t s 
in the snow l ead ing to a window of room 214. The windows of 
room 214 were wide open (R. 332-333). Someone had been "messing 
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around" in room 214 (R. 362), and had locked the hallway door 
so the door to 214 could not be opened from the hallway (R. 334). 
The Appellant, his daughter and son-in-law specifically checked 
the area where the hole was and observed that the lath and plaster 
had not been disturbed (R. 335, 362 & 388). Later that night 
the son-in-law again checked the room and took special notice 
of the hole (R. 388). 
The Appellant, his wife, and his managers were aware 
of the intruder (R. 336), but no one reported the intrusion 
to the police or to the Respondents (R. 336, 366, 372), and 
prior to the burglary no one had advised Respondents of problems 
with transients, of Mr. Garcia and his brother, about the theft 
of tools, apartment break-ins, or about the existence of the 
hole in the floor above the jewelry store (R. 346, 366, 399, 
433, 434, 437, 455 & 456). 
Appellant's manager checked room 214 again Monday 
morning and discovered that the hole had been kicked through, 
allowing easy access into the jewelry store and that a rope 
ladder was tied to a stud and dropped down into the jewelry 
store (R. 370-371). The investigating officer testified that 
the hole was the entryway used by the burglars (R. 278) (Exhibit 
1-B shows the hole and the rope ladder). 
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The alarm company manager testified that any alarm 
system could be defeated if a person could get to itf and if 
he had the proper tools, knowledge and time (R. 580 & 584). 
It was not even necessary for the burglars to enlarge 
the hole (R. 658). The hole in the floor allowed the burglars 
access into the jewelry store and they were able to defeat the. 
alarm system (R. 312), and exit through the back door (R. 308) 
with a safe full of valuables, as well as other merchandise, 
which has put Respondents out of business (R. 661). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. A Landlord owes a duty of ordinary prudence and 
care to see that the premises are reasonably safe and suitable 
for the intended uses for which they are leased. The Landlord 
is responsible for injuries caused by latent defects or serious 
conditions which he created or of which he reasonably could 
foresee would expose others to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
Premises are not accepted "as is" when the Landlord creates 
defects which are only apparent to him when no notice of defect 
is given. The duty of ordinary care was explained to the jury 
by Jury Instruction No. 9. 
2. The evidence shows that Landlord failed to warn 
the Appellants, that the Landlord made a "bad assumption", and 
that the Landlord acted so as to raise an issue of failure to 
use ordinary care which was properly submitted to the jury to 
determine. The Landlord is responsible to protect against criminal 
acts which could have been reasonably foreseeable, and for which 
he failed to warn or to use ordinary care for the protection 
of Appellants' property from the risk Landlord created. 
3. The testimony of the Landlord's manager, the invest-
igating policemen and the exhibits show that the hole created 
by the Landlord was used as the access point for the criminals. 
Under Utah Law, there is liability for criminal behavior which 
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could have been reasonably foreseen and for failure to use ordinary 
care or to warn* Without access the burglars could not have 
accomplished the burglary. 
4. The Respondents were competent to testify as to 
the value of their merchandise, what it cost them, and what 
they sell it for. In addition, by experience, two of the Re-
spondents' witnesses qualify as expert witnesses, and are fully 
capable and experienced to give appraisals and opinions thereon. 
The lists prepared by the Appellants were prepared close to 
the burglary at the request of the police, and, due to the fact 
that records were in the safe taken, were the best evidence 
Appellants had to offer. There was proper foundation. Values 
were established by competent expert testimony. Exceptions 
to the heresay rule apply. The lists submitted were later sub-
stantiated by the analysis of the Respondent's tax returns that 
was made by the Appellant's counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A LANDLORD OWES A DUTY OF ORDINARY PRUDENCE AND CARE 
TO KEEP THE PREMISES REASONABLY SAFE AND SUITABLE FOR THE INTENDED 
USE FOR WHICH THEY ARE LEASED. 
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The Appellant citing the case of Jesperson v. Deseret 
News, 119 Ut. 235 (1951), argues that a tenant accepts the premises 
"as is", and that the rule of caveat emptor applies. As pointed 
out in that case, the evidence was clear that both the lessor 
and lessee had an equal opportunity to ascertain the condition 
of the flooring. In our case, the evidence established that 
the Landlord made the hole, he created the defect. This was 
after the lessee had possession of the premises. There was 
testimony that the lessee had been shown a fully completed apartment 
on the 3rd floor, but had never been shown the remodeling going 
on on the 2nd floor. As stated by Appellant, the door to 214 
was locked. Respondents, prior to the burglary, had never been 
invited to examine that room. Respondents were not made aware 
of the drug addict with a brother with a criminal record, of 
the break-ins into apartments, of stolen tools, of the transients, 
nor were they told of the removal of the storage items, the 
existence of the hole, the removal of the sheetrock around the 
closet space, or of the intruder into room 214 the afternoon 
before the burglary. All of these items were within the exclusive 
knowledge and control of the Appellant. In our case, the condition 
of room 214 and the suspicious circumstances were not equally 
apparent to both the Landlord and the tenant. Tenant did not 
accept the premises "as is" because tenant had no knowledge 
of the defect created by the Landlord. 
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As per Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah 
1978), a Landlord may be liable for injuries caused by defects 
or dangerous conditions which he creates or is aware, and which 
he should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable 
risk of harm. As pointed out by the Court, a Landlord in such 
situations is bound to a standard of ordinary prudence and care 
to see that the premises are reasonably safe and suitable for 
the intended uses for which they are leased. 
In our case, it is clear that the Landlord had knowledge 
and had done things which raised factual issues which were properly 
submitted to the jury to determine if the Landlord had used 
ordinary prudence and care. 
The case of Robicheaux v. Roy, 352 S.2nd 766 (Louisiana 
1977), cited by Appellant, relies upon specific code provisions 
of Louisiana which relieved the Landlord of any duty to protect 
the lessee against disturbance by a third person with no right 
to enter the premises. Our case differs in that we have no 
such similar code provision in Utah, and further, in our case 
the Landlord, not another tenant, had control of the premises 
in room 214. The Landlord made the hole and discovered the 
intruder before the burglary, as well as being aware of other 
suspicious circumstances. 
-11-
The case of Peter Piper Tailoring Company v. Dobbiny 
192 S.W. 1044 (Mo. 1917), also cited by Appellant, involves 
a fact situation where allegedly the Landlord had a duty to 
provide a night watchman and the night watchman negligently 
went to sleep, during which time a burglary was committed. 
The Missouri Court, in that case, focused upon the written Lease 
Agreement of the parties, and because there was no written provision 
in the Lease Agreement requiring a night watchman there was 
no liability. Again, our case has a completely different factual 
situation and does not involve the interpretation of a written 
Lease Agreement. The Appellant was the only party with knowledge 
of the existence of the hole, of the drug addict with a criminal 
brother, of the transients, of the removal of the items stored 
in the room, of the removal of the sheetrock surrounding the 
area where the hole was, and of the intruder into the room the 
afternoon before the burglary. Again, as per the Jesperson 
case (supra), the Respondent had no equal opportunity to examine 
the premises in the locked room 214, and had not been given 
the benefit of Appellant's knowledge of the intruder and the 
suspicious circumstances. Also as per Stephenson (supra), the 
Landlord in our case created the risk by making the hole, by 
uncovering it, and by making a "bad assumption" that the area 
where the hole was was also bugged. 
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The Appellant argues that no instructions were given 
the jury on Appellant's duty of care. Respondents respectfully 
submit that Appellant's duty of ordinary prudence and care were 
explained to the jury as per instructions No. 9 (R. 96). 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT HAD A DOTY OF ORDINARY CARE TO WARN 
OR TO PROTECT THE RESPONDENTS PROM CRIMINAL ACTS WHICH COOLD 
HAVE BEEN REASONABLY FORESEEABLE AS THE RESULT OF THE RISK CREATED 
BY THE APPELLANT AND/OR REASONABLY APPARENT BECADSE OF APPELLANT'S 
KNOWLEDGE. 
Appellant claims there are no Utah cases on the issue 
of criminal attacks of third parties. Respondent respectfully 
cites the case of Mitchell vs. Pearson Enterprises, 3UAR 21 
(Utah 1985)f which involved a claim for wrongful death against 
an Innkeeper. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court stated some 
general principles which would also apply to our case: 
An Innkeeper owes its guests a duty of ordinary care 
to see that the premises assigned to them are reasonably safe 
for their use and occupancy. (The same standard also applies 
to a Landlord as per the Stephenson case [supra]). In the exercise 
of ordinary care, the amount of caution required will vary with 
the nature of the act and the surrounding circumstances. 
-13-
Citing the Texas Court of Civil Appeals case 
of Walkoviar v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623 (1979) [an 
Innkeeper] , has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect 
... from intentional injuries caused by third persons if he 
has reason to know that such acts are likely to occur, either 
generally or at some particular time. Liability for injuries 
may arise from the failure to ... exercise reasonable care to 
discover that such acts by third persons are occurring, or are 
likely to occur, coupled with the failure to provide reasonable 
means to protect his patrons from the harm or to give a warning 
adequate to enable the patrons to avoid harm. 
If evidence is sufficient to raise issues of fact 
as to whether security practices were reasonable or prudent 
in light of the circumstances, then the issue should be resolved 
by the trier of fact (Mitchell at 23). In the Mitchell case, 
evidence elicited through depositions was sufficient to raise 
issues of fact with respect to whether the Defendants were negligent 
in providing adequate hotel security. In our case, Respondent 
submits that there is also sufficient evidence of negligence 
that it is proper for the trier of fact — the jury to decide 
same. The jury, after review of the evidence: the pictures, 
testimony on point of entry, that any alarm system can be defeated 
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with access, time, tools and knowledge; Appellant's knowledge 
of prior attempt, of transients, of drug addict with brother 
with criminal record, of apartment break-ins; and of the unauthorized 
intrusion the afternoon before the burglary; as well as the 
admission of the Appellant that he made a "bad assumption" in 
thinking that the lath and plaster was bugged below the hole 
he made. There is also the clear inference that the Appellant 
and/or his managers foresaw the possibility of the use of the 
hole as an access point for criminals prior to the burglary, 
as shown by the testimony that the Appellant and his daughter 
and son-in-law all specifically observed and noted the hole 
prior to the burglary. 
On the issue of negligence, the jury concluded that 
the Appellant was 100% negligent (R. 114). 
POINT III 
APPELLANT CAN BE LIABLE FOR INTERVENING CRIMINAL ACTS 
OP THIRD PARTIES AND IT WAS PROPER FOR A JURY TO FIND PROXIMATE 
CAUSE IF THE INTERVENING CRIMINAL ACTS COULD HAVE REASONABLY 
BEEN FORESEEN BY THE APPELLANT. 
The Mitchell case (supra) also stated that there must 
be evidence to establish a direct causal connection between 
the negligence and the injury. In the Mitchell case, the alleged 
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negligence could not be connected to the murder because there 
was no proof as to how the murderer gained access into the deceased's 
room, because the jury would have to speculate as to access 
and as to whether the specific items alleged as negligence caused 
the injury, the Court upheld the District Court's summary judgment. 
In the immediate case the manager, police officer, and photos 
clearly show that the hole was used as the access point. It 
is also clear that the Appellant had knowledge and awareness 
of circumstances which clearly would establish the appropriateness 
of submitting the issue of proximate cause to the jury. The 
jury ruled that Appellant's negligence caused 100% of the injury 
to Respondent. 
"Criminal conduct of a third person 
would not preclude a finding of 
proximate cause if the intervening 
agency was itself a foreseeable 
act". (Mitchell, 23). 
The discovery of an "intruder" the afternoon before 
the burglary, in light of all of the surrounding circumstances 
and the knowledge of the Appellant and Appellant's managers, 
clearly shows that there was sufficient evidence to submit the 
issue of proximate cause to the jury. 
In addition to the Mitchell case and the authority 
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cited in that case, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Strong 
vs. Granite Furniture, 294 P.303 (Utah 19 ) at 306: 
"Whether or not a negligent act 
may be said to constitute the 
proximate cause of the injury 
depends in a large measure to 
the facts and circumstances of 
each particular case." 
Also at page 307 citing 45 C.J. 936 S 495: 
"Where illegal act was of a nature 
which might have been anticipated 
... liable ... notwithstanding 
intervention." 
In 78 ALR 471, a notation on intervening criminal 
acts states the test is whether the intervening criminal act 
could have been reasonably foreseen and cites the Utah case 
of Strong v. Granite Furniture Co. (supra) as authority. 
The New Jersey case of McCappin v. Park Capitol Corpor-
ation, 126 A2d 51 (1956), which was a Landlord-Tenant case, 
stated that to establish proximate cause it is sufficient to 
show that according to common experience of mankind the resulting 
injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent 
act. 
The New York case of DeLorena v. Slud, 95 NYS 2d 163 
(1949), involved a Landlord who gave the key to a tenant's apartment 
to an unauthorized person, which resulted in property being 
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stolen by the unauthorized person. The Court reasoned in that 
case that the use of the key for criminal purpose was reasonably 
foreseeable and that the intervening force of the unauthorized 
person's theft was an incident of the risk which the Landlord 
himself created, therefore the Landlord was liable for the loss. 
Respondent would submit that this case, in light of the Utah 
Stephenson (supra) case, which requires a Landlord to assume 
responsibility for defects and dangerous conditions which he 
creates would also apply to our case. It is clear the Appellant 
created the hole which was the access point for the burglary, 
and in light of the intruder's discovery it was clearly an issue 
for the jury to determine whether the situation the Appellant 
created created a foreseeable risk of criminal intervention 
in light of Appellant's knowledge and all of the surrounding 
circumstances. 
The Utah case of Hillyard v. Utah By-Products, 263 
P.2d 287 (1953), established that liability exists if the intervening 
forces were to a degree foreseeable. 
Appellant cites the case of King v. Ilikai Properties, 
639 P.2d 657 (Hawaii, 1981), which involved a criminal assault 
by three unknown persons upon a condominium leasee and her guest. 
In that case, there was an absence of any special circumstances 
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before the incident, and because there was no casual connection 
between the premises itself and the assault, liability was not 
imposed. The Court did cite the case of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts 
Avenue Apartment Corporation, 141 U.S. App D.C. 370, 439 F2d 
477 (1970), and noted that in that case liability was imposed 
upon a Landlord for the criminal acts of third persons because 
of a decline in security and notices received by the Landlord 
of prior attacks occuring since the decline in security. It 
is clear that if circumstances exist prior to the criminal event 
that these circumstances should be weighted by the trier of 
fact to determine negligence and proximate cause. 
Appellant's case of Davis v. Allied Supermarkets, 
Inc., 547 D.2d 963 (Okla., 1976), involved a purse snatching 
in a grocery store parking lot and alleged that the lighting 
was inadequate and personnel inadequate in an alleged high crime 
area. The Court noted the absence of any exceptional circumstances 
and therefore no liability. 
The Utah case of Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693 
(Utah, 1982), cited by Appellant involved an assault in a bowling 
alley upon a patron by a member of another bowling team. The 
Court noted that there had been no prior evidence of violence 
or previous violent activities and the tension and animosity 
reported was equally apparent to the Plaintiff. The standard 
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of ordinary care to protect patrons was noted and the Court 
concluded as a matter of law there was not evidence of circumstances 
prior to the incident that were such that a person of ordinary 
prudence might have reasonably anticipated the danger of such 
an assault* Our case clearly has enough evidence of prior circum-
stances, prior knowledge, plus the creation of a risk, that 
the issue of whether the Appellant had used ordinary care was 
properly submitted to the jury. 
The inference is that Appellant and his managers foresaw 
the possibility of a break-in after discovery of the intruder, 
because each of them took special note of the hole, and at least 
in Appellant's case, he was not overly concerned because of 
his "bad assumption" that the lath and plaster under the hole 
was bugged. Appellant had knowledge of many prior circumstances 
and the existence of the hole, and of the intruder, which was 
not known by Respondents. The evidence established that the 
Appellant could have reasonably foreseen the possibility of 
the burglary, and therefore negligence and proximate cause issues 
were properly submitted to the jury. 
The jury was properly instructed on the issue of proximate 
cause by Instruction No. 10 (R. 97), No. 11 (R. 98), No. 12 
(R. 99), No. 13 (R. 100), No. 14 (R. 101) and No. 15 (R. 102), 
and the jury found that the negligence of the Appellant was 
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a proximate cause of the loss suffered by the Respondents (R. 113). 
POINT IV 
ADEQUATE FOUNDATION ON DAMAGES WAS ESTABLISHED AND 
RESPONDENTS EXHIBITS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
The record established that many of the records of 
the Respondents, which were kept in the smaller safe, were taken 
by the burglars, and that there was no duplicate records (R. 465, 
477, 621 & 622), 
The Respondents were asked by the police to prepare 
a description of all of the items that had been taken (R. 293) 
and because many of the records were taken, Respondents were 
told to "try to remember" all of the things taken (R. 437-438). 
This procedure was done by Audrey Steadman, Christine Steadman, 
Virgil Steadman and Rodney Steadman (R. 438), working together 
immediately after the burglary (R. 406-407). All 4 individuals 
were present and participated in the creation of the inventories 
of losses which were logged in a red book from which most of 
Respondent's exhibits were taken (R. 457 & 510). 
As part of this procedure Exhibit 6 was an inventory 
of all items that had not been taken by the burglars (R. 407). 
These 4 individuals observed empty showcases (R. 406), an empty 
cash register, display cases, empty watch boxes and floor cases, 
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as i s shown by the photographs taken a f t e r the burglary, Exhibi ts 
9A through 9E, and they were a lso aware of what was in the sa fe 
taken by the burglars (R. 398, 411 & 436). 
The Respondents had been a t t h e same l o c a t i o n f o r 
20 years (R. 418), and were famil iar with a l l of t h e i r merchandise 
(R. 466 & 511). 
The va lues e s t a b l i s h e d were given by Vi rg i l Steadman 
and Rodney Steadman (R. 428, 439, 467), and were based on experience 
and wholesa le p r i c e l i s t s from t h e i r s u p p l i e r s (R. 468-469) . 
As to t h e i r experience, i t was es tab l i shed tha t as p a r t of t h e i r 
b u s i n e s s they did a p p r a i s a l s (R. 499 ) , and t h a t the b u s i n e s s 
had been s t a r t e d by V i r g i l ' s f a t h e r , Edward, who t a u g h t h i s 
t r a d e to V i r g i l , and in t u r n , V i r g i l t augh t the t r a d e to h i s 
son, Rodney. This was a 3 generat ion business spanning 72 y e a r s 
(R. 504 & 661). 
As to spec i f i c items of damages claimed: 
(1) Gold Stock; $ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 t o $ 3 , 2 0 0 . 0 0 . I t was 
t e s t i f i e d by both Vi rg i l and Rodney tha t t h i s was 14 cara t white 
gold on hand (R. 470 & 523) , and t h a t t h i s va lue was the cos t 
t o them, or the wholesa le va lue (R. 524 & 640) , and i s based 
on the spot p r ice (R. 471, 641 & 642) , not inc luded on E x h i b i t 
8. 
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(2) Cash: $1,574.46, Exhibit 16 (R. 518). Audrey 
and Virgilfs personal cash, $472.00 (R. 411), $546.00, Christine 
and Rodney's personal cash (R. 435), $105.00, money that goes 
into cash register, and $431.46, checks and cash taken in 3/31/84 
(R. 518). 
(3) Coins; $60.00, Virgil's birth date of 1916 (R. 505). 
TOTAL ON SET ITEMS: $4,634.46 
(4) Inventory and Stock: $34,118.74, which represents 
a 30% to 50% marked up retail price. 
There was testimony that the markup was 30% to 50% 
on all stock and inventory items (R. 429, 471, 472, 474 & 478), 
and that the values on all of these items given on the Exhibits 
were the retail values, or the price to the customer (R. 477 
& 502). This retail value was established with each individual 
category: watches (R. 512) Exhibit 10; loose diamonds (R. 513) 
Exhibit 11; diamond rings (R. 514) Exhibit 12; stone rings (R. 515) 
Exhibit 13; earrings (R. 516) Exhibit 14; pendants and chains 
(R. 517) Exhibit 15; charms (R. 519) Exhibit 17; and wallets 
(R. 411 & 519) Exhibit 17. 
Included in the stock and inventory totals were personal 
items: a loose diamond owned by Audrey and Virgil Steadman 
(R. 411, 426 & 427), and a diamond wedding ring owned by Christine 
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and Rodney Steadman (R. 435), and some antique watches owned 
by Rodney Steadman (R. 439). The jury apparently took into 
consideration the full 50% markup to come up with $17,059.37 
on the stock and inventory items, which added to the $4,634.46 
equals exactly the figure of $21,693.83 awarded as damages to 
the Respondents (R. 216-218). 
Respondents submit that pursuant to Rule 701, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, all 4 of Respondent's witnesses could properly 
give their opinions as lay witnesses, based upon their perceptions 
as witnesses, and Virgil Steadman and Rodney Steadman, the witnesses 
who offered opinions as to the values of inventory and stock 
items, qualify under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
as expert witnesses because of their experience and knowledge 
in giving appraisals and in running a jewelry business. It 
is hard to believe that Appellant could argue that a family, 
after 72 years of business experience, would not know its business 
and the value of its merchandise. In addition, the property 
taken was owned by these individuals, or by the corporation 
of which they were the sole stockholders and employees. All 
of these witnesses testified as to matters of which they had 
personal knowledge, Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Appellant cites Rule 1006, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
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and the case of Gull Laboratories, Inc. vs. Lewis A. Roser Company, 
589 P.2d 756 (Utah 1978), and argues that Respondents did not 
carry their burden of making records available. As pointed 
out in that case, there was a failure to lay a foundation as 
to the unavailability of records. This case established that 
records were not available because they were contained in the 
safe taken by the burglars (R. 465, 477, 621 & 622). 
Assuming argumendo, the unavailability of invoices 
from suppliers had not been established, it was established 
that these invoices would have been reflected on the tax statements 
as cost of goods sold (R. 478), and the record shows that according 
to the tax records of Steadman Enterprises, Inc., there was 
an ending inventory of $3,428.00 in December of 1983 (R. 631 
& 632). From its beginning in 1978, the only merchandise owned 
by the corporation and called inventory on the tax return was 
the watches (R. 635, 637 & 412). Exhibit 10 shows that, consistent 
with what was commonly carried in watches, that $3,166.00 worth 
of watches were stolen. Regarding the cost of goods sold, the 
1983 tax return shows that during 1983 $15,628.66 worth of goods 
were purchased (R. 631-32) to replace items that had been sold 
during the year (R. 640), and there was testimony that usually 
a large amount of stock was purchased after the first of the 
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year for Va len t ine ' s Day, Mother's Dayf Father 's Day and Graduations 
(R. 545), and tha t the inventory would have been about the same 
in A p r i l of 1984 as i t had been the end of 1983 (R. 634). These 
f a c t s t h a t were e s t a b l i s h e d by A p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l ' s r e v i e w 
of tax r e tu rns from 1979 (R. 627) through the end of 1983 (R. 634) 
c l e a r l y show tha t at l e a s t $19 f 056.66 worth of merchandise was 
in the s t o r e and t h i s f coupled with the $4,634.46 in se t i tems, 
p l u s p e r s o n a l i tems s t o l e n , c l e a r l y shows t h a t t h e j u r y was 
not out of l i ne in awarding $21,693.83 in damages. 
In response to Appel lan t ' s contention tha t Respondent's 
E x h i b i t s did not q u a l i f y as exemptions to he resay exemptions, 
Respondents r e s p e c t f u l l y submit the same could have and were 
p r o p e r l y submit ted under Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence (1) 
P r e s e n t same impress ion — the E x h i b i t s were p r e p a r e d w h i l e 
the w i t n e s s e s were p e r c e i v i n g the condi t ions immediately a f te r 
the b u r g l a r y . (6) Records of r e g u l a r l y conducted a c t i v i t y — 
the E x h i b i t s were made a t or near the t ime of the burglary by 
persons of knowledge pursuant to a request to do so by the Po l i ce . 
(24) Other exceptions — t h i s was the best evidence the Respondents 
could o f f e r because of the l o s s of t h e i r r e c o r d s , and i t i s 
f u l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the tax r e t u r n s of the corporat ion, and 
i s the most p r o b a t i v e on damages t h a t could have r e a s o n a b l y 
been produced. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant owed a duty of ordinary care and prudence 
to Respondents. The jury was properly instructed as to that 
duty, and the evidence was sufficient to submit the issue to 
the jury. The risk of the hole in the floor above the jewelry 
store, and the discovery of an intruder the afternoon before 
the burglary in light of Appellant's knowledge and all of the 
circumstances established that the Appellant should have reasonably 
foreseen the risk of criminal intervention, and therefore Appellant's 
negligence was a proper proximate cause of Respondent's injuries, 
and the jury was properly instructed thereon. Exhibits and 
testimony on damages were properly submitted and the jury was 
able to make a reasonable decision on damages based upon the 
evidence and not upon speculation. 
Respondents respectfully submit that no errors were 
committed by the trial court, and in the event any error was 
committed that it was not substantial or prejudiced so as to 
warrant the reversal of the jury's verdict. 
Therefore, Respondents respectfully ask this Court 
to uphold the Judgment and Order of the trial court and to award 
Respondents their costs incurred herein, and for such other 
relief as deemed appropriate. 
DATED this day of MarckV1986. 
LEE BISHOP 
Attorney fo^ Respondents 
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ADDENDUM 
Instruction No. 9, given by the Court (R. 96) 
Instruction No. 10, given by the Court (R. 97) 
Instruction No. 11, given by the Court (R. 98) 
Instruction No. 12, given by the Court (R. 99) 
Instruction No. 13, given by the Court (R. 100) 
Instruction No. 14, given by the Court (R. 101) 
Instruction No. 15, given by the Court (R. 102) 
Exhibit 8-P 
Exhibit 10-P 
Exhibit 11-P 
Exhibit 12-P 
Exhibit 13-P 
Exhibit 14-P 
Exhibit 15-P 
Exhibit 16-P 
Exhibit 17-P 
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T.J. TSAKALOS 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Appellant 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that negligence means the failure 
to exercise ordinary care. It is the failure to exercise that 
degree of care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent person 
would exercise in his own affairs under like or similar circum-
stances. Every person is negligent when, without intending 
to do any wrong, he does such an act or omits to take such a 
precaution that, under the circumstances present, he, as an 
ordinarily prudent person, ought reasonably to foresee that 
he will thereby expose the interest of another to an unreasonable 
risk of harm. In determining whether his conduct will subject 
the interest of another person to an unreasonable risk of harm, 
a person is required to take into account such surrounding 
circumstances as would be taken into account by a reasonably 
prudent person, to possess such knowledge as is possessed by 
an ordinarily prudent person, and to use such judgment and discretion 
as are exercised by persons of reasonable intelligence and judgment 
under the same or similar circumstances. 
4 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient 
cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors 
that accomplish the injury. 
Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence produces the injury without which the result 
would not have occurred. The fact that the instrumentality which 
produced the injury was criminal conduct of a third person would 
not preclude a finding of proximate cause if the intervening 
agency was itself a foreseeable act. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one 
proximate cause of an injury, consisting of only one factor, one 
act or the conduct of only one person. To the contrary, the acts 
and omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the 
efficient cause of an injury, and in such a case, each of the 
participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a proximate 
cause and both may be held responsible. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you find a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in 
this case, you must find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs1 injuries. The burden of proof 
is likewise upon the plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence their damage, if any. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that before a party can be held 
liable for injury to any person, it must appear from the evidence 
that such person was guilty of negligence and, furthermore, that 
the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident ^IA^^LJLUC 
& 
1QO 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The mere fact that an incident happened, considered 
alone, does not support an inference that any party to this 
action was ngeligent. Negligence and proximate cause are never 
presumed, but must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence 
by the party who bears the burden of such proof* The burden 
rests upon the plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant, WMSma*mS*mk&, ig& negligent. 
Likewise, defendant bears the burden of proof in alleging that 
the plaintiffs were negligent. 
it 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
An intervening cause is one classified as an 
independent cause which steps between the original wrongful acts 
or omissions of the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff/ 
and alters the natural and normal sequence of events and thereby 
produces a result which would not have otherwise occurred* It is 
a cause which/ by its nature, becomes the proximate cause of the 
injury. 
If you find that the acts of others in committing 
criminal acts constitute an intervening cause as defined above, 
you may find that the defendants1 acts or omissions/ if any,. were 
not the cause of plaintiffs1 claimed damages. 
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